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INTRODUCTION
Today, smart technology in the form of tablets and smartphones is a cherished tool for most people.
Instant online access that allows for extensive interacting on social media, texting, playing video
games and music, checking for news and weather has turned smart technology into “an integral
part of the lives of all ages worldwide” (Samaha and Hawi, 2016, p. 321). The multi-functional
nature of smart technology makes it attractive as a tool for learning and education (Kucirkova,
2014; Schilhab, 2017a) leading, however, to noticeable changes in affordances and embodiment,
and consequently learning (Mangen and Schilhab, 2012)1.
For instance, reading scholars increasingly find that changing the physical reading platform
(from a printed book to a digital screen) leads to marked alterations in comprehension of the
text read. They point to factors related to the affordance of the reading device such as haptics
e.g., perception through touch (Mangen and Kuiken, 2014) and lighting conditions (e.g., Benedetto
et al., 2013) as aspects undergoing a significant change which result in a reduced learning outcome.
This observation is corroborated by studies probing for accompanying metacognitive processing
that show less accurate prediction of performance and more erratic study-time regulation when
reading on screen versus on paper (Ackerman and Goldsmith, 2011).
Such effects on literary reading are not agreed upon unanimously. Some researchers emphasize
our “native biological plasticity” that among other things entails “bodily reconfiguration” Clark
(2007 p. 263) and major “re-embodiment” (Ihde, 2010) when describing human cognition in
relation to smart technology use. The argument asserts that the reduced comprehension when
reading on screen is a novelty effect in the sense that subjects are proficient print-readers while
still lacking in screen expertise (Hayler, 2015). Over time, people will adjust to the affordances of
the new devices and the comprehension issues apparent today will evaporate as screen reading
abilities are simultaneously refined and technology has co-evolved for this specific task.
In so far as screen use is tool-use, the proposed plasticity- and embodiment perspective prevalent
in human-technology interaction studies seems pertinent. The question remains, however, if
prolonged exposure and subsequent development of embodied skills is all it takes for humans to
adapt to the affordances of smart technology. A relevant objection to the novelty claim could be that
the comprehension issues associated with screen reading exemplifies a need to go beyond automatic
embodiment processes and conceptualize the specifics of the mental processes that account for our
adaptation to the environment.
In the following article, I unfold why automatic skill learningmay not be an exhaustive answer to
the affordances provided by smart technology. First, I discuss what characterizes smart technology
1Kiverstein and Rietveld (2015, p. 709), affordances are ”the multiple possibilities for action that stand out as relevant for an
individual in a particular situation because of their needs and concerns”. In this paper I compare those affordances that we
address using’skilled intentionality’ (ibid.) and affordances that attract our conscious attention. See however 1979/1986 for
the original reading of the term.
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tools from the perspective of attention to better determine
significant features of the interaction and what adaptive processes
would entail. I conclude that section by proposing that the
interaction calls for self-regulation. Second, I discuss a socially
mediated mechanism that seems especially supportive in the
building of such capacities necessary for environmental coping
in general and smart technology use in particular.
SMART TECHNOLOGY AND ATTENTION
Part of the controversy over reading performance in literature
studies stems from the inevitable complex relations we form
with the environment (e.g., Jin et al., 2015). On the one hand,
when musicians interact with their instruments like pianos for
instance, or high jumpers with their bars, they adapt to factors
of the interaction that all else being equal manifest little variation
(e.g., Jabusch et al., 2009). Crudely put, to adapt to similarities
of tasks consists among other things in strengthening the overall
connection among neurons in the neural correlate to increase
the signaling efficiency (Draganski et al., 2004; Jäncke, 2009).
A skilled performance partly evolves because of strengthening
of automatic bottom-up processes elicited by the repetition of
particular elements in the task (Maguire et al., 2006).
This may be exemplified by an fMRI study on how processes
underlying imagery differ among novices and experts in a
complex motor skill (the high jump) showing considerable
divergence with respect to the involvement of motor areas such
as the supplementary motor area (SMA) and primary motor
cortex (Olsson et al., 2008). Subjects were asked to imagine the
performance of a full jump, with special emphasis on certain
stages, such as take-off or clearing the bar. Novices who did
not have previous experience of the high jump showed more
activation in areas that suggested that they took an external
view of the task (watching the jumps from without as if out
of the body) possibly, because their previous experiences with
high jumps were primarily as spectators to high jumps. Thus,
the activation of SMA, which is suggested to be responsible
for internally guided actions both while executed and imagined,
was lower in novices than it was in expert high jumpers.
Following the authors, the use of an internal perspective
during motor imagery of a complex skill depends on well-
established motor representations of the skill before these
can translate into a motor/internal pattern of brain activity
(Olsson et al., 2008, p. 5).
On the other hand, we have interactions that are characterized
by intrinsic variability. In the course of evolution, our coping
with such seemingly unstable factors has been optimized by
development of fine-tuned attentional resources to help us focus
on particular aspects of the environment (e.g., Kaplan and
Berman, 2010). Why is this of importance when dealing with
our possibilities for adapting to smart technology? The reason
is that part of our interaction with smart phones and tablets
when for instance reading is defined especially by the erratic
factors that elicit our vigilance (e.g., Chun et al., 2011). In fact, the
multi-functional affordance of the tool may itself drag attentional
resources diminishing the attention we normally allocate to
reading in order to comprehend the text (Wolf and Barzillai,
2009, for a recent discussion on stable and variable affordances
of relevance to the present discussion, see Sakreida et al., 2016).
The appeal for diverse activities such as checking for emails,
surfing the internet, or tapping into social media while reading
is in effect even if notifications and various alerts are deliberately
turned off. The mere awareness of putative distraction may
reallocate attention from comprehension processes (Przybyliski
and Weinstein, 2013; Schilhab et al. submitted).
THE NEED FOR INTENTIONALITY
Besides the smart-tool features, smart technology affords instant
distraction and gratification, such as watching videos, gaming
or establishing social contact online, which drags attention from
other tasks. Thus, those smart technology interactions that drag
attentional resources are not prone to implicate automatized
processes in the procedural sense of the term. Hence, appropriate
adaptation to smart technology as a tool needs to go beyondmere
embodiment and to involve some kind of attention regulation as
suggested by studies emphasizing risks of addiction in connection
to increased smart technology (Wei et al., 2012; Tarafdar et al.,
2013). When people check for messages and updates not because
they need to, but out of habit (Lee et al., 2014) and are deeply
attracted to the device even in the company of others (Radesky
et al., 2014), social relations may become challenged (Turkle,
2015).
But how do we cultivate attention regulation?
Attention regulation is closely connected to executive
functions (EFs), which refer to an assembly of functions in
use when we concentrate and think. The core functions are
inhibition, working memory, and cognitive flexibility and form
the basis for “higher-order” EFs such as reasoning, problem
solving, and planning (Diamond, 2013).
Working memory is the function that holds back information
in mind to be manipulated. It is involved in making sense
of linguistic information, to derive a general principle, and
acknowledge novel relations among old ideas (Diamond and Lee,
2011).
Inhibition refers to control of behavior, such as when
inhibiting habitual responses and resisting short-sighted
temptations such as leaving a task unsolved or incomplete.
Inhibition is exercised in attention regulation to corroborate
focused and directed attention and in emotional self-control.
It is EFs that allow us to perform “oﬄine” tasks (Wilson,
2002), i.e., tasks that do not depend on information from the
environment but on sustained imagery (e.g., Schilhab, 2015a),
while fencing off disturbing stimulations (Vanhaudenhuyse et al.,
2010). During reading for instance, the active construction of
meaning (Wolf and Barzillai, 2009) involves maintenance of
competing interpretations until a final solution to the developing
understanding is found (e.g., Smallwood et al., 2008).
On the other hand, cognitive flexibility manages perspective
change, for instance switching between different aspects, thinking
outside the box, and understanding the perspective of other
people (Schilhab, 2015a).
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Overall, EFs have been linked to better academic skills, better
quality of life, and improved self-assessment and are to some
extent trainable (Diamond, 2012).
THE SOCIAL DIMENSION OF THE “INNER”
SYSTEM
An assertion of attention regulation implicitly assumes that there
exist mental operations beyond those evolving as bottom-up
embodiment bound adaptations to the environment (though
kinds of attention regulation may be closely connected to the
action-perception cycle, see for instance Jin and Lee, 2013 and
Jin et al., 2015 for the discussion of how the training of Kih may
lead to affordance-control).
Here, I suggest that, although attention regulation exists as a
potential operation of the mind of the individual, its actualization
depends on social interaction in a certain kind of conversational
exchange (Schilhab, 2015b). Ordinary discourse, in which
participants exchange information on the fly, may happen at a
superficial level without substantial attentional investment on
the part of the interlocutors. Everyday exchanges of words for
instance need not recruit focal thought to satisfy the purpose of
a dialogue. For conversation to result in acquisition of abstract
knowledge, the more knowledgeable (the parent or care taker)
must take responsibility to create mutual comprehensibility in
the conversation by assessing the perspective of the learner
and fill in the gaps to ensure coherence of the emerging
conversation (a condition salient also in Vygotsky’s zone of
proximal development e.g., Hasse, 2014; see also Schilhab, 2015b,
2017b). Learning about abstract referents one has had no direct
experience with places a different stress on the ability to sustain
understanding. To convey abstract knowledge, the interlocutor
will need to establish metaphors or phrases that immediately
capture the concrete meaning of the abstract knowledge. Just
as the adult in ostensive learning furnishes the immediate
environment, for instance holding up a cup, pointing to the cup
and exclaiming “cup” (e.g., Pulvermüller, 2012), the interlocutor
furnishes the world that is off-line. He or she seeks mutual
comprehensibility and makes mental tableaus that are thought
to match the understanding of the child. In concrete language
acquisition, interlocutors merely point to the referent of the
conversation, whereas in abstract language acquisition, the
interlocutor points by using words.
Thus, the mechanisms that lead to understanding
fundamentally change. The cognitive efforts behind this
process are comprehensive and advanced and include mastering
an attentional switch from monitoring external stimulation to
the internal “stream of consciousness” (e.g., Dennett, 1992).
Language elicited imagination depends on a certain degree of
linguistic competence and is therefore likely to emerge relatively
later in language acquisition. Moreover, for the ability to fully
develop it is crucial to have emphatic interlocutors. My assertion
is that a subject’s abilities to acquire abstract knowledge and
with that become trained in monitoring the internal stream of
consciousness evolve most readily through careful guidance and
therefore may in fact vary noticeably as an effect of a “master.”
FINAL REMARKS
Some of the reported side effects of smart technology
employment referred to by contemporary research, such as
novelty effects, will definitely vanish when users become more
proficient. Here, the embodiment processes work in response
to the immediately present environment. However, combating
distractors, which often operate as attention-grabbers, inherent
to the affordances of smart technology calls for cognitive meta-
processes elicited independently of the interaction with smart
technology. As with any addictive “substance” that modern
Western life has admitted almost unrestricted access to, such
as calories, sessile life, alcohol, cholesterol, or on a larger scale
fossil fuels, it is up to the individual to evolve a well-functioning,
albeit cognitively exhausting, self-control. Though many avenues
to achieve this ability are open, I suggest that the individual
may quite effectively be gently nudged in the right direction
by engaging in deep conversations with interlocutors. Mental
mechanisms central to mediating understanding of what may not
be concrete or present, simultaneously enhance the mechanisms
we need in order to appropriately adapt to smart technology.
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